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Abstract 
Legal frameworks exist within democracies to prevent the misuse and abuse of personal data that law enforcement au-
thorities obtain from private communication service providers. The fundamental rights to respect for private life and 
the protection of personal data underpin this framework within the European Union. Accordingly, the protection of the 
principles and safeguards required by these rights is key to ensuring that the oversight of State surveillance powers is 
robust and transparent. Furthermore, without the robust scrutiny of independent judicial review, the principles and 
safeguards guaranteed by these rights may become more illusory than real. Following the Edward Snowden revelations, 
major concerns have been raised worldwide regarding the legality, necessity and proportionality standards governing 
these laws. In 2014, the highest court in the EU struck down the legal framework that imposed a mandatory duty on 
communication service providers to undertake the mass retention of metadata for secret intelligence and law enforce-
ment authorities across the EU. This article considers the influence of the Snowden revelations on this landmark judg-
ment. Subsequently, the analysis explores the significance of this ruling for the future reform of EU law governing 
metadata surveillance and its contribution to the worldwide debate on indiscriminate and covert monitoring in the 
post-Snowden era. 
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1. Introduction 
Laws within democratic states prohibit public authori-
ties from looking into the private lives of their citizens 
merely because they have the technological capacity to 
do so. The right to respect for private life and the pro-
tection of personal data underpin such national legal 
frameworks within the European Union (EU). Accord-
ingly, the protection of this human right is key to en-
suring that the oversight of State powers that permit 
the covert surveillance of communications for legiti-
mate purposes (such as the prevention of terrorism 
and serious crime) is adequate and transparent. More-
over, without the robust scrutiny of independent judi-
cial review, the principles and safeguards that ensure 
the effective application of this human right are at risk 
from becoming more illusory than real. Following the 
Edward Snowden revelations, major concerns were 
raised worldwide regarding the legality, necessity and 
proportionality standards governing State surveillance 
powers (Greenwald, 2014; Harding, 2014). Shortly 
thereafter in 2014, the highest court in the EU struck 
down the legal framework that imposed a mandatory 
duty on communication service providers to undertake 
the mass retention of their customers’ metadata for up 
to two years in case this information may have assisted 
in the investigation, detection and prosecution of seri-
ous crime (Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital 
Rights Ireland and Seitlinger). This article considers the 
influence of the Snowden revelations on this landmark 
judgment. The analysis begins by addressing the key 
factors that have contributed to the increasing im-
portance of metadata for modern State surveillance. 
This examination then outlines the principles and safe-
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guards guaranteed by the right to respect for private 
life under Article 8 of the international human rights 
instrument of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) that apply to the covert surveillance of 
metadata by public authorities within the EU. The anal-
ysis thereafter discusses the origins, main provisions 
and controversy surrounding the legal framework that 
entrenched the mass and indiscriminate retention of 
metadata across the EU (section 2). Next, the article 
provides a brief overview of the Edward Snowden reve-
lations with a focus on the covert mass metadata sur-
veillance regime uncovered therein (section 3). The 
analysis subsequently turns to the main findings of the 
landmark judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU/Luxembourg Court), the role of the Snowden 
revelations and the implications of this ruling for the 
EU legal order and data protection policy developments 
both within and beyond the EU (section 4). Lastly, the 
article concludes with a brief summary (section 5). 
2. Metadata Surveillance 
2.1. What Is Metadata Surveillance? 
The term “metadata” relates to information generated 
or processed as a consequence of a communication’s 
transmission. Much can be revealed from this data in-
cluding: “latitude, longitude and altitude of the send-
er’s or recipient’s terminal, direction of travel…any 
naming, numbering or addressing information, volume 
of a communication, network on which the communi-
cation originates or terminates, and the beginning, end 
or duration of a connection” (Young, 2004). Metadata 
therefore concerns the context as opposed to the con-
tent of a communication and covers many types of in-
formation such as traffic data, location data, user data 
and the subscriber data of the device/service being used 
(e.g. cellular phone network or Internet service provid-
er). As a result, metadata is a rich source of personal in-
formation as it reveals the “who” (parties involved), the 
“when”, how long and how often, (time, duration and 
frequency), the “what” (type of communication, e.g. 
phone call, message, e-mail), the “how” (the communi-
cation device used, e.g. landline telephony, smartphone, 
tablet) and the “where” (location of devices used) in-
volved in every communication we make. Moreover, the 
collection, aggregation and analysis of metadata can 
provide very detailed information regarding an individu-
al’s beliefs, preferences and behaviour.  
In the 21st century, the depth and breath of infor-
mation concerning an individual’s private life that can 
now be revealed through the metadata surveillance of 
communications have advanced in tandem with dra-
matic technological developments.  
Of particular note in this respect are two major 
changes regarding how society now communicates. 
First, there has been a distinct shift in the past century 
from the prevailing use of non-portable devices such as 
landline phones, faxes and personal computers to 
handheld smartphones and tablets. Secondly, major 
advancements in digitization and Internet access has led 
to the convergence of all of our communications (calls, 
e-mails, web searches, online shopping) to one device 
that is both mobile and Internet-enabled (Wicker, 2013). 
The constant trail of metadata left behind from the 
ceaseless use of these so-called “smart” communica-
tions devices facilitates the collection of unprecedented 
amounts of data and presents unique privacy challenges. 
As highlighted by the US Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), “more than other types of technology, mobile de-
vices are typically personal to an individual, almost al-
ways on, and with the user” (FTC, 2013).  
Furthermore, given the increasingly ubiquitous use 
of mobile communication devices, these changes have 
made metadata surveillance just as valuable as (if not 
more than) the content of your communications for 
both law enforcement and commercial purposes. Con-
sequently, the collection and processing of an individu-
al’s metadata can provide a level of monitoring of an 
individual’s every communication and movement that 
was never attainable previously. For instance, Malte 
Spitz, a German Green Party representative, demon-
strated the scope of this surveillance in a request to his 
mobile phone provider. Spitz sought a record of all the 
metadata collected and retained from the use of his 
mobile phone. Over the course of six months, this 
metadata tracked his geographical location and the use 
of his phone more than 35,000 times building a de-
tailed narrative of his movements and his communica-
tions (Spitz, 2012). In other words, access to the con-
tent of our communications is no longer necessary to 
show what and whom we’re interested in and what’s 
important to us (Schneier, 2015). 
2.2. Metadata Surveillance Threatens Privacy, Equality 
and Liberty 
Unquestionably, the major technological developments 
outlined above have made the monitoring of metadata 
an essential and important tool for national security 
and law enforcement authorities around the world. 
The value of this surveillance was confirmed by Gen-
eral Michael Hayden, former director of the US Nation-
al Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), who noted in a public debate concerning 
privacy and the NSA: “We kill people based on metada-
ta” (Hayden, 2014). 
However, indiscriminate mass metadata surveil-
lance of entire populations by governments generates 
abundant amounts of personal data and consequently 
represents a substantial threat to the privacy, equality 
and liberty of individuals. This information can often be 
sensitive in nature and may identify many aspects of an 
individual’s private life, including personal and profes-
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sional relationships, racial or ethnic origin, political af-
filiations, religious beliefs, trade-union membership, fi-
nancial status or medical history, to name just a few. 
The subsequent “aggregation” of this data into com-
prehensive online dossiers can reveal more to govern-
ments and private industry about an individual’s identi-
ty and behaviour, than the individual may ever be 
aware of (Solove, 2008).  
Accordingly, the creation, access and dissemination 
of such detailed digital profiles could result in insidious 
threats of computer-enhanced discrimination and ma-
nipulation that ought to raise considerable concern. 
The groups that face exclusion from access to opportu-
nities (e.g. employment), goods or services based on 
data obtained from their Internet usage (particularly e-
mail and web browsing) are less likely to be aware of 
their status as victims of categorical discrimination 
(Lessig, 1999). As a result, they will be even less likely 
to organize as an aggrieved group in order to challenge 
their exclusion from opportunities provided by the 
State or private sector (Gandy, 2003), thereby being 
prevented from asserting their constitutionally pro-
tected rights to privacy, equality and liberty.  
2.3. Metadata Surveillance and the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
Contracting States to the international human rights 
instrument of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), who are also Member States of the EU, 
have argued in the past that the intrusion posed by 
metadata surveillance represents nothing more than a 
minimal interference with an individual’s right to re-
spect for private life (Ni Loideain, 2014a). However, 
since its leading judgment of Malone v. United King-
dom delivered in 1984, the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg (the international court estab-
lished under the ECHR which reviews challenges to vio-
lations of the ECHR by Contracting States) has rejected 
this assertion.  
Instead, the Strasbourg Court has consistently held 
that any processing (e.g. retention, access, analysis, 
storage, third-party dissemination) of metadata from 
an individual’s communications (including telephony, 
e-mail, Internet usage) constitutes an interference with 
the right to respect for private life, as guaranteed un-
der Article 8 of the ECHR. Moreover, the Strasbourg 
Court has subsequently upheld a number of challenges 
(Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain (1999); Copland v. Unit-
ed Kingdom (2007); Liberty v. United Kingdom (2009)) 
regarding the illegal use of these covert metadata sur-
veillance powers by Contracting States. As will be ex-
amined below (see section 4.1), the highest court in 
the EU (CJEU/Luxembourg Court) would later close 
ranks with the approach of the Strasbourg Court in its 
landmark post-Snowden judgment of Joined Cases C-
293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and 
Seitlinger. The Luxembourg Court would do so by strik-
ing down an EU law that had raised human rights con-
cerns within EU institutions and national courts across 
Europe since its inception. 
2.4. Mass Metadata Surveillance and EU Law 
Under the weight of considerable political pressure for 
increased counter-terrorism powers that followed the 
9/11 attacks and the Madrid and London bombings in 
2004 and 2005, the Data Retention Directive 
(2006/24/EC) was rapidly drafted, passed and entered 
into force by the EU legislature in 2006 (Murphy, 2012; 
Ni Loideain, 2011). The Directive provided that metadata 
derived from the communications of every natural per-
son and legal entity within the EU must be retained and 
made available for the purpose of “the investigation, de-
tection and prosecution of serious crime”, as defined by 
each Member State in its national law. Specifically, this 
blanket measure imposed a mandatory duty on Mem-
ber States to require private communication service 
providers to store and facilitate access to all of their 
customers’ metadata to competent national authori-
ties for up to two years. Under the 2006 EU Directive, 
this metadata concerned the devices used, the type of 
communication, the parties involved, their locations 
and the times and frequency of their communications. 
The broad scope of the Directive encompassed 
metadata from landline and mobile telephony, Internet 
access, Internet telephony and e-mail. 
The EU legislature stated that the aim of the Data 
Retention Directive was to harmonize the varying do-
mestic laws of EU countries concerning the retention of 
certain metadata by the private sector in order to en-
sure the availability of this information for the investi-
gation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, as 
defined by each country under their national law. Nev-
ertheless, many representatives of the EU Parliament, 
data protection authorities and NGOs across the EU 
consistently contested the compatibility of the Data 
Retention Directive with Article 8 of the ECHR and the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The EU Charter, ef-
fectively the EU’s Bill of Rights, affirms the commitment 
of the EU to human rights and governs EU institutions 
and Member States when they are “implementing” EU 
law (EU Charter, Art.51(1)). Therefore, the scope of the 
EU Charter’s application is much more narrow when 
compared to the US Bill of Rights as it does not impose a 
“federal standard” against which all national laws of the 
28 Member States within the EU may be evaluated and 
set aside (Groussot & Pech, 2010). 
The decision of the EU legislature to allow EU 
Member States to require the private sector to retain 
their customers’ metadata for up to two years raised 
particularly major concerns. Previously, communication 
service providers would only keep this personal data 
for six months on average for billing purposes. There 
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would have been some exceptions where information 
was held for longer if needed for the purpose of na-
tional security (Hawkes, 2006). Under the EU Data Re-
tention Directive, however, storing this personal data 
for longer than six months was no longer the excep-
tion. Strikingly, no empirical evidence was put forward 
by any of the EU institutions to justify such a significant 
departure from the well-established principles of EU 
data protection law, particularly the tenet that person-
al data be retained for specific purposes within a scope 
that is necessary and proportionate. Even the Impact 
Assessment Report prepared by the European Com-
mission, which served as the basis for proposing the 
Data Retention Directive, indicated that an upper max-
imum limit of only one year would be appropriate (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2005). The Report warned that “a 
longer retention period would appear to be of little 
added value for law enforcement authorities while hav-
ing important financial consequences for operators and 
[infringing] disproportionately on citizens’ privacy”.  
Prior to its review by the CJEU in 2014, many of the 
highest national constitutional courts across the EU 
(Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany and Roma-
nia) had already upheld challenges striking down na-
tional provisions implementing the EU Data Retention 
Directive. The main grounds underpinning these judg-
ments concerned the surveillance regimes’ inadequate 
oversight and security standards and overall incompat-
ibility with the legality, necessity and proportionality 
requirements mandated by the right to respect for pri-
vate life, as guaranteed under Article 8 of the ECHR (Ni 
Loideain, 2014b). 
3. The Snowden Revelations and Metadata 
Surveillance 
Edward Snowden is a US citizen who now has tempo-
rary residence in Russia. He is a former computer ana-
lyst for the CIA and was subsequently employed as a 
defense consultant with Booz Allen Hamilton—a pri-
vate management and technology consulting company 
contracted by the NSA. In June 2013 in Hong Kong, 
Snowden released thousands of US government rec-
ords collected in his capacity at Booz Allen Hamilton 
revealing details of several programmes involving the 
mass surveillance of communications belonging to in-
dividuals both within and outside of the US to a select 
group of journalists in the UK and US news media, 
mainly The Guardian and Washington Post (Greenwald, 
2014; Harding, 2014). Subsequently, news media out-
lets worldwide have also highlighted the questionable 
legality of US national security authorities sharing per-
sonal data obtained from these large-scale monitoring 
regimes with government authorities outside of the US 
(Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2014).  
Among the many types of covert surveillance re-
gimes that became public knowledge following the 
Snowden revelations, it came to light that one particu-
lar programme had been in operation for more than 
seven years. Similar to the EU Data Retention Directive, 
this monitoring involved the mass retention and access 
to metadata from the use of mobile phones for nation-
al security and law enforcement purposes. Following a 
court order issued under the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act 1978 (FISA), as amended, the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Court required Verizon (one of 
the largest US communication service providers) to 
provide millions of phone records concerning its US 
customers on a daily basis to the NSA. This order in-
cluded the telephony metadata of both US and non-US 
citizens as it applied to communications “(i) between 
the United States and abroad”; or (ii) wholly within the 
United States, including local telephone calls” (FISA Or-
der, 2013). Although the duration of the FISA order was 
only for a three-month period, the same order had 
been the subject of renewal for seven years. 
The revelations have prompted an ongoing global 
debate concerning the rapid pace of technological de-
velopments in the area of communications surveillance 
and the implications posed by this large-scale secret 
monitoring for individual’s rights to privacy and the se-
curity of their personal data (Kuner et al., 2015). Fur-
thermore, the revelations have also drawn attention to 
the significant role played by the private sector in the 
mass surveillance of communications for governments. 
Of notable controversy recently has been the question 
of whether governments should have a “back door” to 
the encrypted communications of the customers be-
longing to these private companies (Hayden, 2015). 
This issue has raised major concerns regarding the ex-
tent to which private actors should be co-opted into 
the blanket monitoring of individuals’ communications 
for governments. 
The subsequent complex debate on future law re-
form has resulted in a diverse range of responses from 
legal academics, the judiciary and the communication 
services industry in the EU and US. For example, in a 
report by the Review Group on Intelligence and Com-
munications Technologies commissioned by US Presi-
dent Obama, the authors recommended that the bulk 
retention of metadata for State surveillance purposes 
should be the responsibility of communication service 
providers or other third-party private actors (The Pres-
ident’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communica-
tions Technologies, 2013). In their view, storage by the 
government of bulk metadata creates potential risks to 
public trust, personal privacy, and civil liberty. Howev-
er, the Grand Chamber of the highest court in the EU 
held the opposite in the landmark judgment of Digital 
Rights Ireland and Seitlinger shortly thereafter in April 
2014. The CJEU struck down the 2006 EU Data Reten-
tion Directive for being in breach of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. As examined above (see section 
2.4), this impugned EU law had imposed a mandatory 
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obligation on all Member States of the EU several years 
earlier to require private communication service pro-
viders to retain the metadata of their customers for the 
investigation, detection and prosecution of serious 
crime for up to two years. 
4. The Post-Snowden Era and the Landmark Judgment 
of the CJEU 
4.1. Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger 
The landmark judgment of Digital Rights Ireland and 
Seitlinger responded to requests from the High Court 
of Ireland and the Verfassungsgerichthof (Constitution-
al Court) of Austria that the CJEU examine the validity 
of the EU Data Retention Directive, particularly its 
compliance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Due to this metadata surveillance regime being an area 
of EU law, these courts were required to refer to the 
Luxembourg Court. EU law provides that national 
courts of EU Member States are unable to rule on the 
validity of EU legislation and therefore the constitu-
tional courts of Ireland and Austria could not review 
the legality of the 2006 EU Directive (Case C-314/85 Fo-
to-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199). 
Both proceedings arose from challenges to invalidate 
the national laws that implemented the EU Directive 
into Austrian and Irish law. Given the overlap of issues 
raised between the cases, the CJEU issued a joined re-
sponse to both national courts. In a notable reflection 
of the reservations held by EU citizens towards this 
mass and indiscriminate retention of metadata, the 
reference to the CJEU from the Verfassungsgerichthof 
was the result of a constitutional challenge brought by 
more than 11,000 applicants (De Vries et al., 2011). 
On 8 April 2014, the Luxembourg Court (sitting as a 
Grand Chamber of fifteen judges), seems to have 
acknowledged the human rights concerns raised by the 
national courts, data protection authorities and NGOs 
across Europe, by holding that the Data Retention Di-
rective was invalid under EU law. The Court recognised 
the growing importance of metadata surveillance as “a 
valuable tool” for criminal investigations (para. 43 of 
the judgment). Nevertheless, the Court made clear that 
interfering “with the fundamental rights of practically 
the entire European population” for the legitimate ob-
jective of tackling serious crime does not justify surveil-
lance regimes of the indiscriminate and unreasonable 
nature permitted under the Directive (para. 56). The 
Court criticized the starkly indiscriminate and therefore 
disproportionate scope of the Directive given that it 
applied to “all persons and all means of electronic 
communication as well as all traffic data without any 
differentiation, limitation or exception being made in 
the light of the objective of fighting against serious 
crime” (para. 56). 
In particular, the Court took issue with the length of 
the retention period, that access by law enforcement 
authorities to data retained under the Directive did not 
depend on prior approval by a judge or another inde-
pendent body and that the Directive did not explicitly 
require that Member States ensure that the private 
sector provide a high level of protection and security 
for the retained data (para. 66). The Court also high-
lighted that the Directive did not ensure the “irreversi-
ble destruction” of the data at the end of the retention 
period (para. 67). Additionally, in an uncharacteristic 
departure from its traditional minimalist approach, the 
Court addressed an issue that was not referred by ei-
ther of the national constitutional courts. Specifically, 
the Court raised concerns regarding the location of the 
data retention under the fundamental right to protec-
tion of personal data guaranteed by Article 8 of the EU 
Charter. The Court held that the metadata retained 
under the Directive should have remained within the 
EU in order to fully ensure, as required under Article 
8(3), the control “by an independent authority of com-
pliance with the requirements of protection and securi-
ty” (para. 68). 
Based on all of the above grounds, the Court held 
that the “EU legislature had exceeded the limits im-
posed by compliance with the principle of proportion-
ality” guaranteed under the fundamental rights to re-
spect for private life and the protection of personal 
data under Articles 7, 8 and 52 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (para. 69). By not limiting the tem-
poral effect of its judgment, the Court declared the in-
validity of the Directive to take effect ab initio (from 
the beginning), thereby erasing its entire existence 
from the EU legal order. 
4.2. The Influence of the Snowden Revelations 
Unquestionably, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger is 
a landmark judgment likely to have reassured national 
courts of the EU’s commitment to fundamental rights. 
The judgment has also been lauded for confirming that 
high standards of privacy and data protection apply to 
the mass processing of personal data within the EU 
(Guild & Carrera, 2014; Lynskey, 2014). Despite the im-
plications for other EU counter-terrorism policies, by 
invalidating the entire existence of the Data Retention 
Directive due to its incompatibility with the EU Charter, 
the Court “confirmed its commitment to an advanced 
system for the protection of human rights even in the 
context of national security” (Fabbrini, 2014). Further-
more, this is the first time that the highest Court in the 
EU has ever struck down an entire EU legal instrument 
due to its incompatibility with the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights.  
Moreover, to the surprise of many, the Luxembourg 
Court in Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger also made 
a novel and major contribution to the EU legislative 
framework governing data protection, and for any fu-
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ture EU data retention measures. Notably, the Court 
appears to have effectively established that “data sov-
ereignty’ is a key element of the right to the protection 
of personal data guaranteed under Article 8 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Without this element, 
the Court stressed, the control by an independent su-
pervisory authority of ensuring compliance with neces-
sary data protection and data security requirements, 
required under Article 8 of the EU Charter, cannot be 
fully ensured. Strikingly, the Court did not limit the 
scope of this interpretation of Article 8(3) of the EU 
Charter to data retained under EU law for the purposes 
of tackling terrorism and serious crime, thereby making 
this requirement applicable to the retention of data 
pursuant to any EU legal measure. Accordingly, some 
commentators have gone as far as to note that the 
judgment could be interpreted as preventing the trans-
fer of personal data to non-EU private and public bod-
ies since access and use of this information would then 
be removed from the control of an independent super-
visory authority, contrary to EU fundamental rights 
(Granger & Irion, 2014). 
Consequently, the potential policy implications of 
the CJEU’s interpretation of Article 8 of the EU Charter 
in Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger for the ongoing 
reform of EU data protection law are of considerable 
significance to public and private bodies both within 
the EU and beyond. By engaging so forcefully with an 
issue not referred by either of the national constitu-
tional courts or decisive to the judgment, the Court’s 
initiative in making this policy recommendation strong-
ly suggests that the Snowden revelations played a role 
in the Court’s assessment of the Data Retention Di-
rective. While concerns relating to the need for data 
sovereignty between the EU and the US can be traced 
back to the 1970s, the emergence of the Snowden rev-
elations has undoubtedly given impetus to a global de-
bate on jurisdictional restrictions and the flow of per-
sonal data (Kuner, Cate, Millard, Svantesson, & 
Lynskey, 2015). To explicitly include a requirement of 
physical data retention within the EU under the EU 
Charter may result in major revisions to current provi-
sions and exemptions under EU data protection law. In 
particular, such a requirement raises questions regard-
ing the processing of data by the private sector and law 
enforcement authorities outside of the EU—a matter 
shortly to be before the Luxembourg Court in its review 
of the EU-US Safe Harbor Agreement. 
4.3. Implications for the EU Legal Order and Beyond 
A consensus among EU Internet regulation policymak-
ers and scholars has emerged that the Snowden revela-
tions have been influential in “emboldening” the ap-
proach of the highest court in the EU in its review of 
matters concerning privacy and data protection (Cen-
tre for European Legal Studies, 2015). Two landmark 
judgments delivered in the post-Snowden era by the 
CJEU support this contention.  
First in April 2014 (as examined above), the CJEU 
struck down the entire legal existence of an EU law in 
Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger that entrenched a 
regime of mass metadata surveillance across the EU on 
the ground that it was incompatible with the EU Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights. Furthermore, the highest 
court in the EU also surprised EU privacy scholars in its 
adjudication that data sovereignty forms part of the 
right to the protection of personal data guaranteed un-
der Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
Secondly, shortly thereafter on 13 May 2014, the 
Grand Chamber of the Court delivered a second land-
mark privacy judgment where it established that EU cit-
izens have a right to have links concerning them delist-
ed from search engines that essentially encroach upon 
their private lives and the protection of their personal 
data (Case C-131/12 Google Spain v. AEPD and Mario 
Costeja Gonzalez). Specifically, the Court recognized a 
right under the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive 
(95/46/EC) for individuals to remove links generated by 
Internet search engines concerning searches for an in-
dividual’s name which produce results that are “inade-
quate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive” 
(para. 92 of judgment). While the focus of Google Spain 
was not directly concerned with State surveillance, it 
nevertheless reaffirms the emboldened stance of the 
CJEU in matters affecting EU citizens’ fundamental 
rights to respect for their private life and the protec-
tion of their personal data in the post-Snowden era.  
Unlike the much-lauded Digital Rights Ireland and 
Seitlinger, however, it is important to note that Google 
Spain has divided academics, policymakers and the 
communication services industry worldwide. Some 
have gone so far as to describe the ruling as an in-
fringement to the rights of access to information, free-
dom of expression and freedom of speech as it “opens 
the door to large scale private censorship in Europe” 
(CCIA, 2014). Others have argued that the practical im-
pact of the so-called “right to be forgotten” (more accu-
rately, the right to be delisted) will be comparatively lim-
ited in scope given the removal by search engines of 
links that involve millions of copyright violations on a 
monthly basis (Mayer-Schonberger, 2014). Notwith-
standing the aforementioned concerns, it is important to 
highlight that Google Spain was an (albeit ill-conceived) 
attempt by the Court to address two important prob-
lems for the protection of privacy in the 21st century. 
First, “the Internet’s ability to preserve indefinitely all its 
information about you, no matter how unfortunate or 
misleading” (Zittrain, 2014) and secondly, the enor-
mous influence of search engines regarding your online 
(and inevitably offline) identity and reputation. 
Unquestionably, however, both of these striking 
decisions delivered by the Luxembourg Court concern-
ing the protection of the right to respect for private life 
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and the protection of personal data since the Snowden 
revelations have strengthened the protection afforded 
by these human rights under EU law. The influence of 
the revelations for the protection of privacy through ju-
dicial review in Europe may extend further still in the fu-
ture, given a pending application before the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and in another re-
lated judgment pending before the CJEU in Luxembourg. 
Both of these forthcoming human rights challenges 
concern the surveillance of personal data for national 
security and law enforcement purposes. The ongoing 
proceedings before the Strasbourg Court, Big Brother 
Watch and Others v. United Kingdom (App.58170/13), 
have been brought by three NGOs and Dr Constanze 
Kurz who allege that they may have been subject to 
surveillance by UK national security authorities in re-
ceipt of foreign intercepted material relating to their 
electronic communications. The applicants submit that 
this monitoring system (made possible by the PRISM, 
UPSTREAM and TEMPORA programmes revealed by 
Edward Snowden) violates their right to respect for pri-
vate life, as guaranteed under Article 8 ECHR. In partic-
ular, the applicants assert that the requirements under 
the legality condition of Article 8 ECHR have not been 
satisfied by the UK legislature given that there is no 
statutory regime governing such surveillance and 
therefore there is an absence of adequate safeguards. 
Furthermore, the applicants contend that the “generic 
interception” of these external communications, mere-
ly on the basis that such communications have been 
transmitted by transatlantic fibre-optic cables, is an in-
herently disproportionate interference with the private 
lives of thousands, perhaps millions, of people.  
The second set of proceedings pending before the 
CJEU in Luxembourg involves an Austria-based NGO 
(Europe v Facebook) which requested that the Data 
Protection Commissioner of Ireland issue proceedings 
against Apple and Facebook (both US companies have 
their European headquarters in Dublin) for violating EU 
data protection law by providing the personal data of 
EU citizens to the NSA. However, the then Commis-
sioner, Mr Billy Hawkes, declined on the basis that both 
companies were parties to the Safe Harbor Agreement. 
This Agreement is a self-regulatory framework en-
forced by the US FTC and governs the exchange of per-
sonal data between the EU and US, thereby allowing 
US law enforcement authorities to access this infor-
mation within the US. The Commissioner’s decision 
was then challenged before the High Court of Ireland. 
Due to the implications of this judgment for the legal 
validity of the EU Data Protection legal framework, the 
national constitutional court referred the matter to the 
CJEU where oral hearings were held in March 2015. Spe-
cifically, the Irish High Court noted that the critical issue 
for the CJEU to determine concerns the interpretation of 
the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive and the decision 
by the European Commission in 2000 that under the 
Safe Harbor Agreement the US provides an adequate 
level of data protection. Both of these frameworks 
were drafted decades before social media became the 
increasingly ubiquitous form of communication that it 
is today, long before companies such as Facebook ever 
existed and before the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights became law in 2009. In light of the latter devel-
opment, the Irish High Court seeks clarification from 
the CJEU regarding whether the 1995 EU Directive and 
the 2000 Commission’s Safe Harbor Decision should be 
re-evaluated given the fundamental right of EU citizens 
to the protection of their personal data as guaranteed 
under Article 8 of the EU Charter (Case C-362/14 
Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner). It will be 
significant to see whether the Luxembourg Court will 
endorse the ongoing work of the EU legislature to re-
form and update the current Safe Harbor Agreement 
with the US Government (Kuner, 2015). Alternatively, 
the CJEU may adopt a more emboldened approach in 
assessing whether the role of the impugned Agree-
ment within the EU Data Protection legal framework is 
compatible with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Whatever the outcome, such major issues concerning 
the protection of EU citizens’ rights to privacy and data 
protection would not be before the highest court in the 
EU if not for the Snowden Revelations which (as high-
lighted by the Irish High Court) formed the “backdrop” 
to this latest judicial review. 
Finally, it is also important to note that the next test 
for the commitment of the EU legislature to EU funda-
mental rights compliance will be the future of the draft 
EU Directive on Passenger Name Records Directive 
(PNR Directive). This legislation seeks to harmonize the 
mass retention of personal data from travel infor-
mation for law enforcement purposes across the EU. 
The proposed measure was revised to comply with the 
standards under Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, following the annulment of the 
Data Retention Directive by the CJEU in Digital Rights 
Ireland and Seitlinger. Although the European Parlia-
ment previously rejected the PNR Directive proposal in 
2013, a revised draft of the PNR Directive is currently 
before the European Parliament (European Parliament, 
2015). Although the scope of data retention under the 
draft Directive has been reduced, its proportionality 
remains highly suspect given the length of its retention 
periods—5 years for terrorism offences, 4 years for “se-
rious transnational crime”. It will be telling to see how 
much of a role the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris will 
play in how Parliament responds to the revised draft in 
this new political context. In other words, will the Par-
liament ensure that the revised PNR Directive meets the 
stringent human rights standards set out by the Luxem-
bourg Court in Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger? Or, is 
it inevitable that this EU Directive will be subject to chal-
lenge for its lack of compliance with the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights before the CJEU in future? 
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5. Conclusion 
In the landmark judgment of Digital Rights Ireland and 
Seitlinger, the highest court in the EU rightly erased 
from the EU legal order the imposition of a mass Inter-
net metadata surveillance regime on Member States 
that had blatantly disrespected the privacy and data 
protection rights of more than 500 million EU citizens. 
This post-Snowden judgment marks the first time that 
the CJEU has ever struck down an entire EU legal in-
strument due to its incompatibility with the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, thereby establishing greater 
certainty of an EU governed by a fundamental rights 
culture. Moreover, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger 
established unequivocally that strict legality, necessity 
and proportionality standards must underpin the pro-
tection of privacy and data protection rights in all fu-
ture EU legislation involving large-scale processing of 
personal data (including metadata).  
Furthermore, the highest court in the EU also sur-
prised EU privacy scholars in its adjudication that data 
sovereignty forms part of the right to the protection of 
personal data guaranteed under Article 8 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. To explicitly include a 
requirement of physical data retention within the EU 
under the EU Charter may result in major revisions to 
current provisions and exemptions under EU data pro-
tection law. In particular, such a requirement raises 
questions regarding the processing of data by the pri-
vate sector and law enforcement authorities outside of 
the EU—a matter shortly to be before the Luxembourg 
Court in its review of the EU-US Safe Harbor Agree-
ment. The potential policy implications of the Court’s 
interpretation of Article 8 of the EU Charter in Digital 
Rights Ireland and Seitlinger for the ongoing reform of 
EU data protection law are of considerable significance 
to EU and non-EU public and private bodies.  
In addition to the striking down of the EU Data Re-
tention Directive in 2014, the CJEU delivered a second 
landmark privacy judgment shortly thereafter. In 
Google Spain, the Luxembourg Court established that 
EU citizens have a right to have links concerning them 
delisted from search engines that essentially encroach 
upon their private lives and the protection of their per-
sonal data. Notwithstanding the understandable con-
cerns raised by freedom of expression advocates 
prompted by the judgment, it is important to highlight 
that Google Spain was an (albeit ill-conceived) attempt 
by the Court to address two important problems for 
the protection of privacy in the 21st century. First, the 
indefinite and all-encompassing memory of the Inter-
net regarding an individual’s personal data and second-
ly, the enormous influence of search engines regarding 
an individual’s online (and inevitably offline) identity 
and reputation. 
Both of these judgments indicate that the Snowden 
revelations have been influential in emboldening the 
highest court in the EU in its review of matters con-
cerning privacy and the processing of personal data by 
either public or private bodies. In particular, Digital 
Rights Ireland and Seitlinger has contributed to the en-
hanced protection of privacy and data protection in 
any future EU legislation involving mass metadata sur-
veillance. Moreover, the influence of the revelations 
for the protection of information privacy through fu-
ture judicial review proceedings in Europe may extend 
further still. Challenges to the compatibility of systems 
allowing for the covert access and monitoring of com-
munications by US and EU national security and law en-
forcement authorities with Article 8 ECHR and Article 8 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights have been 
brought before the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg, and (again) before the CJEU. Hence, the 
Snowden revelations seem poised to embolden further 
jurisprudential developments and debate concerning 
the future of the legal standards and safeguards essen-
tial for the effective protection of privacy and personal 
data both within and beyond the EU. 
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